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NOTES

United States Magistrates Hearing Civil Cases: The
Constitutionality of Rendering Final Judgments
After Northern Pieline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pie Line Co.
The 1979 amendment to the United States Magistrates Act' is
the latest and most liberal expansion of the federal magistrates' judicial powers, for it permits a magistrate to render final judgments in
civil cases. This procedure reduces litigation costs and thereby in-2
creases access to the federal courts, especially for the disadvantaged.
A recent Supreme Court decision, however, places in controversy the
constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial. In Northern Pipeline Construclion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,3 the Court ruled that certain
final judgments of the federal bankruptcy courts were beyond the
constitutional powers of non-article III courts.4 Since Marathon, the
circuit courts of appeals have questioned the constitutionality of nonarticle III federal magistrates rendering final judgments in civil
cases.5 The courts are finding Marathon inapplicable and the magisI

Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Supp. V 1981)).
2 See S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, repnntedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1469 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Report]. The purpose of the 1979 amendment was
to "further clarify and expand the jurisdiction of United States Magistrates and improve
access to the Federal courts for the less-advantaged." Id. The amendment was part of a
larger congressional scheme:
The Magistrates bill is one in a series of Court reform bills that the committee will
consider this Congress. The committee's permeating policy in all these bills will be
to bring about a judiciary of the highest quality that can deliver speedy, but reasoned, justice and a system that provides the opportunity for access to the judicial
forum for all Americans.
Id.
3 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For further discussion of Marathon, see notes 48-70 infia and accompanying text.
4 458 U.S. at 88.
5 See notes 71-112 infra and accompanying text. The present situation was foreseen in C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 49-50 (4th ed. 1983):
There have been questions of the extent to which the judicial power of the United
States may validly be exercised by United States magistrates, who serve for an eightyear term, and these questions have been sharpened by 1979 amendments to the
Magistrates' Act enlarging the powers of magistrates. These questions will now
have to be examined in light of the Court's 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., in which the Court again struggled with the
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trate civil trial constitutional. 6 Some opinions, however, state that
Marathon is controlling precedent and that the 1979 amendment vio7
lates article III.
This Note argues that Marathon is not controlling and that the
magistrate civil trial is constitutional. Part I surveys the state of the
law, discussing the institutional values embodied in article III, the
purposes and powers of the federal magistrate, and recent decisions
concerning the constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial. Part II
argues that Marathon does not pertain directly to the present issue,

and since the 1979 amendment adequately addresses article III concerns, the magistrate civil trial is constitutional. Part III proposes
several modifications that may improve the magistrate civil trial and
preserve the procedure, should the Supreme Court hear the issue and
find the present amendment unconstitutional.
I.

The State of the Law

The separation of powers and the independence of the federal
judiciary are fundamental principles of American government incorporated into article III of the Constitution.8 The integral role of article III in safeguarding these institutional values was emphasized by
the Framers, and has been continually reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court.9
metaphysics of "constitutional" and "legislative" courts, this time in the context of
bankruptcy courts.
6 See notes 71-112 infa and accompanying text..
7 The issue continues to arise in the circuits and may eventually come before the
Supreme Court. See notes 71-78 and 86-90 infta and accompanying text.
8 See general'y J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135-37 (2d
ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-19, 49-50 (1978). "Certainly, the

constitution does provide for an independent judiciary, by granting article III judges a fixed
salary and life tenure, and by making congressional removal, at least, quite difficult." Id. at
49. See notes 10, 11 infia for the pertinent text of article III.
9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) on the importance of the separation of
powers in the American scheme of government; THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) on
the tenure provision of article III as a protection for the independence of the federal judiciary,
a theme repeated in the subsequent paper on the compensation provision:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of
the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of
human nature, a power over a mans subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we
can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial
from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for
pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter [emphasis in original].
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 512 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1941). For recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on the separation of powers and the independence of the
federal judiciary, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); on checks and balances in general,
see United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Court stated:
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Article III establishes a specialized tribunal vested with the judicial power of the United States, which consists primarily of jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution and federal law, and
over controversies between citizens of different states.' 0 The basic
characteristics of an article III judgeship are life tenure and undiminishable compensation." Cloaked with these protections, article III
judges remain independent of the other branches of the federal government, of the state governments, and of influential private individuals. 12 Such independence is crucial for judicial impartiality and
free development in legal thought.' 3 It also inspires public confidence in the judiciary and attracts highly qualified candidates for
federal judgeships." 4 With few exceptions, litigants in federal court
have the due process right to bring their civil suits before this specialA Judiciary free from control by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there is
a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by
other branches of government. Our Constitution promotes that independence specifically [in article III, § 11.
449 U.S. at 217-218. Marathon contains the Court's most recent assertions on the importance
of article III in the government structure:
As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and
as a guarantee ofjudicial impartiality, Art. III both defines the power and protects
the independence of the Judicial Branch. . . . [The provisions of article III] were
incorporated into the Constitution to ensure the independence of the judiciary from
control of the executive and legislative branches of government.
458 U.S. at 58-59.
10 U.S. CoNST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." Id. § 1.
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." Id.
12 See generally Note, Arlicle III Limits on Article I Courts. The Constilutionaliy of the Bankruptqy
Court and the 1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560, 583-85 (1980) (discussing the protection that the tenure and compensation provisions of article III offer against encroachments
by state governments and private parties).
13 See generaly id The benefits of article III protection were also discussed by the
Supreme Court in Marathon:
These provisions serve other institutional values as well. The independence from
political forces that they guarantee helps to promote public confidence in judicial
determinations. . . . The security that they provide to members of the Judicial
Branch helps to attract well-qualified persons to the federal bench. . . . The guarantee of life tenure insulates the individual judge from improper influences not only
by other branches but by colleagues as well, and thus promotes judicial
individualism.
458 U.S. at 59 n. 10. The original insight, however, dates back to Hamilton, see THE FEDERAuST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
14 See Note, supra note 12, at 583-85.
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ized, protected judicial body.1 5
The Constitution, however, does not mandate that the judicial
power of the United States be vested exclusively in article III
courts.' 6 When strict adherence to the tenure and compensation requirements of article III would unnecessarily hinder governmental
flexibility, Congress has vested judicial powers in non-article III federal courts.1 7 Traditional examples of these legislative courts include
the federal tax, military, territorial, and administrative courts.' 8 The
federal magistrate is a more recent instance, established by Congress
15 The Supreme Court has not declared that litigants in all types and stages of cases
brought in federal court have the absolute right to an article III tribunal. Instead, due process demands a "hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 677 (1950) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). This right usually, but not always, is a hearing before an article III judge.
Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Article III protections exist as much for the sake of the litigants as
the judge. See Kaufman, ChillingJudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 690 (1979); see also
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix Inc., 724 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
16 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 39-52 (discussing the historical development of the
legislative court). After quoting article III, § 1, Wright states:
This would seem to be a very clear declaration that the judicial power, as defined in
the following section of Article III, can only be conferred on courts where the judges
enjoy tenure for good behavior, and assurance against diminution in salary, protections that the Framers, and all succeeding generations, have thought of vital importance in preserving judicial independence. . . . The historical development,
however, has been much more complicated than these seemingly obvious propositions would suggest.
Id. at 39-40. Professor Wright concludes that from the 19th century to the present, the state
of the law has been conflicting and contradictory. Id. at 52. Chief Justice Marshall broke the
ground for legislative courts in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The
Supreme Court has since found that Congress is not required to vest the judicial power of the
United States in article III courts alone, and that article I courts are valid under the necessary
and proper clause. See Swain v. Pressely, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389 (1973); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438 (1929).
17 See general~ Note, supra note 12, at 570; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 396 (2d ed. 1973).
18 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 39-52; The FederalMagistratesAct of 1979. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 71 (1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney Gen., Justice Dep't)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Hearing]. Mr. Meador argued for the 1979 amendment to the
Magistrates Act by analogy to these legislative courts:
Based on both history and authority, it is inaccurate to say that every article III
controversy must be decided at every state only by an article III judge. There are
numerous instances, in the past and present, where non-article III forums enter
binding judgments in article III cases. Large amounts of article III business are
handled by the territorial courts, the U.S. Courts of Military Appeals, the Tax
Courts of the United States, the courts of the District of Columbia, and the State
courts, all of which are non-article III forums.
Id. In Marathon, Justice Brennan recognized these three article I courts as legitimate excep-
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under article I as an adjunct of the district court. 19 The current
question presented to the circuits is whether the magistrate is a legislative judge constitutionally capable of exercising full judicial powers. The answer requires an examination of the purposes and powers
of the federal magistrate.
The magistrate descends from the United States commissioner,
a judicial officer dating from the nineteenth century.2 0 The commissioner assisted the district court in discharging its more perfunctory
duties and represented the court in rural areas. 2 t The status and jurisdiction of the commissioner were inadequate, however, and by the
mid-twentieth century the office was clearly antiquated. 22 In 1968,
Congress replaced the commissioner with the present United States
magistrate.
The 1968 Magistrates Act 2 3 conferred upon this new judicial officer all former duties of the commissioner together with a more permanent status and expanded jurisdiction in order to "reform the first
echelon of the federal judiciary into an effective component in the
modern scheme of justice. '24 The magistrate is the district court's
principle adjunct, assisting with a variety of judicial tasks. Therefore, Congress designed the magistrate to be a flexible, innovative
tions to the general rule that thejudicial power of the United States must vest in an article III
court. 458 U.S. at 64-70; see notes 60-62 in/ra and accompanying text.
19 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in DeCosta v. Columbia
Broadcasting Co., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1975), stated that
"[a] magistrate is an article I judge, being a 'tribunal inferior to the Supreme Court' and
appointed pursuant to the Congressional power under U.S. Const. Article I, Sec. 8, clause 9."
520 F.2d at 503 n.3. The article I status of the federal magistrate was emphasized by Congress in evaluating the constitutionality of the magistrates' jurisdiction. See Divesitv ofCitizenshipJunsdiction/MagistratesRefonn: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciag, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-09 (1977)
(statement of Hon. Joseph D. Tydings) [hereinafter cited as 1977House Hearings]. But see note
61 in/a. For a treatment of the status and history of the federal magistrate, see Spaniol, The
FederalMagistratesAct." Histoy and Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565; McCabe, The Federal
MagistrateAct of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 343 (1979).
20 The commissioners were appointed and removed by the district courts and served four
year terms. They were compensated on a fee schedule, and there was no bar membership
requirement. See Spaniol, supra note 19, at 566; McCabe, supra note 19, at 345-47.
21 See McCabe, supra note 19, at 345-47.
22 See Hearingson the US CommissionerSystem Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciar, 29th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. pt. I, at 1 (1965-66);
H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws
4252 [hereinafter cited as 1968 House Report]; McCabe, supra note 19, at 345-47.
23 Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1113 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-37
(Supp. V 1981)).
24 1968 House Report, supra note 22, at 11.
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instrument under district court control. 25 The magistrate, accordingly, serves either full or part time 26 with a limited term 2 7 and adjustable salary. 2 8 The district judges have the power of
appointment 29 and dismissal, 30 and issue the rules under which the
magistrates operate. 31 These non-article III characteristics allow
each district to tailor the magistrate to the court's particular needs.
In fulfilling these needs, the district judges have uniformly increased
32
their magistrate's judicial powers.
25 Id. at 19; S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967).
26 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (Supp. V 1981).
27 Id.
28 "[Tlhe Salary of a full-time United States Magistrate shall not be reduced, during the
term in which he is serving, below the salary fixed for him at the beginning of that term." 28
U.S.C. § 634(b) (Supp. V 1981). Therefore Congress can lower a magistrate's compensation,
but not below his original salary.
29 The Judicial Conference determines the number of magistrates per district, 28 U.S.C.
§633(b) (Supp. V 1981), and sets the standards for magistrate selection, 28 U.S.C.
§ 631(b)(5) (Supp. V 1981). The district judges appoint the magistrate, and if there is no
concurrence, the chief district judge makes the appointment. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V
1981). The appointee, in addition to complying with the standards set by the Judicial Conference, must be: a member of the state bar for at least five years if he is to be a full time
magistrate, 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981); competent to serve, 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1981); not related by blood or marriage to a judge of the appointing court, 28
U.S.C. § 631(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); not a holder of another civil or military office (with the
exception of part time bankruptcy judges-magistrates, and court clerk-magistrates), 28 U.S.C.
§ 631(c) (Supp. V 1981); and not 70 years or older at time of initial appointment. 28 U.S.C.
§ 631(e) (Supp. V 1981). The magistrate takes an oath of office, 28 U.S.C. § 631(g) (Supp. V
1981), and can be reappointed by the district court if approved by a majority of the district
judges and the judicial conference of the circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 631() (Supp. V 1981). A fulltime magistrate cannot engage in legal practice, and the practice of a part-time magistrate
cannot conflict with his official duties, 28 U.S.C. § 632 (Supp. V 1981).
30 A magistrate may be removed by the district court for a variety of non-impeachable
offenses:

Removal of a magistrate during the term for which he is appointed shall be only for
incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability, but a
magistrate's office shall be terminated if the conference determines that the services
performed by his office are no longer needed. Removal shall be by the judges of the
district court for the judicial district in which the magistrate serves. . . . Before any
order or removal shall be entered, a full specification of the charges shall be furnished to the magistrate, and he shall be accorded by the judge or judges of the
removing court, courts, council or councils an opportunity to be heard on the
charges.
28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (Supp. V 1981).
31 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
32 See McCabe,supra note 19, at 356-61; see also 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 2-4
which states:
The Magistrate system became fully operational nationwide in 1971. During the
intervening 8 years, the district courts have called upon the assistance of these judicial officers to an increasing extent. In those 8 years, the district courts have been
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By the 1979 amendment,3 3 the magistrate had acquired extensive duties in both criminal and civil cases. In the criminal area, these
duties extended to jurisdiction over minor criminal cases.3 4 In the
civil area, the magistrate's responsibilities included determining certain pre-trial matters,3 5 conducting evidentiary hearings,3 6 serving as
a special master,3 7 and performing "any other duty not inconsistent
with the laws and Constitution of the United States."38 This last
provision was the vehicle for district court experimentation with the
magistrate, eventually leading to the 1979 amendment.
The magistrate civil trial amendment validated the practice of
more than half the district courts,3 9 explicitly authorizing the magistrate to render final judgments in any case within the district court's
civil jurisdiction. 40 Congress intended this procedure to increase access to the federal court system, especially for those least equipped to
absorb the delay and expense of federal litigation, and to reduce the
caseload of the district judges. 41 The amendment sets forth two preable to substantially increase their caseload disposition rate (from 315 per judge to
388 per judge), thanks in large part to the assistance provided by U.S. magistrates.
33 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Supp. V 1981).
34 The magistrate has jurisdiction only upon the consent of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
35 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(a) (Supp. V 1981).
36 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(b) (Supp. V 1981).
37 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
38 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
39 McCabe, supra note 19, at 365; 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4.
40 The statute states:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a parttime United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct
any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of
judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The Senate Report elaborates:
The magistrate is empowered to determine the issues of law and the questions of fact
in the case and to direct the clerk of the district court to enter a final judgment
disposing of the litigation. The grant of jurisdiction is limited' by the requirement
that the district judges approve the magistrate's exercise of the authority. This will
enable the court to assure itself that an individual magistrate is fully qualified to try
such cases and that the magistrate's performance of his other duties will not be
unduly impeded.
1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 13. Congress rejected the proposal that the magistrate be
empowered to hear and decide only certain types of cases, reasoning that all litigants should
have equal opportunity to take advantage of the new procedure, and desiring to avoid any
subtle coercion. Id.
41 1979 Senate Report,supra note 2, at 1; 1979 Senate Hearing,supranote 18, at 1 (remarks of
Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Senate Judiciary Comm.):
The purpose of the bill is to expand the civil and criminal jurisdiction of our Federal
magistrates to enable speedier justice and greater access to the courts. . . .The
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requisites, however, for a trial by magistrate: district court designation of the magistrate to hear civil cases, 42 and the voluntary consent
of the litigants. 43 When these requirements are fulfilled, the magistrate may hear the case and render a binding judgment. 44 The district court, however, retains the power to vacate the reference for
good cause.45 Once the magistrate renders judgment, the parties
may further accelerate the judicial process by foregoing the traditional appellate route and appealing directly to the district court
which reviews the case on the record. 46 The court of appeals has the
47
option to extend a second appeal.
Under this system, the magistrates have decided civil suits for
Magistrates Act is part of a comprehensive package legislation supported by the
The
chairman of this committee, the Attorney General and President Carter ....
first step in the process was getting more Federal judges, and that effort culminated
with the passage of the omnibus judgeship bill ...
The Second step is to be enactment of the Magistrates Act, legislation that will
provide greater flexibility to the judicial system by allowing civil cases and minor
criminal cases to be tried before a magistrate if the parties consent. With magistrates handling these matters as well as many motions, conducting arraignments,
and presiding at pre-trial conferences, the valuable time of life tenure article III
judges will be conserved and better put to use on the more momentous issues of
constitutional interpretation for which they are best suited.
Id. at 1-2. See Rodino, MagistrateReform.- A Way to Aid Congerted FederalCourts, 13 TRIAL, Oct.Nov. 1977, at 32.
42 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
43 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The clerk of court obtains consent. The judge
and magistrate cannot influence the decision:
[N]either the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce
any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to a magistrate. Rules of court
for the reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect
the voluntariness of the parties' consent.
44 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
45 "The court may, for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary
circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate under
this subsection." 28 U.S.C.. § 636(e)(6) (Supp. V 1981).
46 The parties may select the regular appellate route to the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(g)(3) (Supp. V 1981). The new appellate procedure provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsection, at the time
of reference to a magistrate, the parties may further consent to appeal on the record
to a judge of the district court in the same manner as on an appeal from a judgment
of the district court to a court of appeals. Wherever possible the local rules of the
district court and the rules promulgated by the conference shall endeavor to make
such appeal expeditious and inexpensive. The district court may affirm, reverse,
modify, or remand the magistrate's judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981). In all other uses of the magistrate in civil cases, the
district court submits the magistrate's findings to a de novo determination. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). See also United States v. Raddatz, 446 U.S. 667 (1980); Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
47 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
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the past several years. But the procedure may run counter to article
III. Marathon heightens the possibility of constitutional conflict, for
in that case the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a situation
analogous to the magistrate civil trial. A preliminary discussion of
Marathon is necessary to appreciate the recent circuit court decisions
on the constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial.
The Marathon opinion generates conflicting interpretations due
to the broad language of the Court's plurality opinion and the narrowness of its ultimate holding. The case arose from reorganization
proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Minnesota.48

Pursuant to the new bankruptcy procedure, 49 the

debtor filed a complaint directly in the bankruptcy court, seeking
damages under state law for various contract claims. 50 A creditor
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 5 1 and
the court denied the motion. 5 2 The matter, as appealed through the
circuits, centered upon section 1471 of the United States Code, in
which Congress created the new bankruptcy courts. 55 While these
courts were technically adjuncts of the district courts,5 4 they operated
independently and possessed a broad grant ofjurisdiction. 55 In addition, the new bankruptcy procedure did not require litigant consent
56
to a non-article III tribunal.
The Supreme Court was sharply divided and did not produce a
majority opinion. 57 The plurality, however, rejected the jurisdiction
48 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 50-52; Levit & Mason, Where
Do We Go From Here? Bankruptgy Administration Post-Marathon, 87 COM. L. J. 353 (1982), for a
complete discussion of the Marathon holding and its ramifications for the federal court system.
49 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981)
50 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982).
51 Id. at 56-57.
52 Id. at 57.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 53. The bankruptcy judges were officially adjuncts of the district court they
served and had limited terms and flexible compensation, 28 U.S.C. § 15 1(a) (Supp. V 198 1).
55 458 U.S. at 54-55, 84-87. The bankruptcy court, through the district court, exercised
jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title II or arising in or related to cases
under title I1." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. V. 1981). The contract claims in Marathon were
related to the general title 11 claim. The new bankruptcy courts were empowered with all
"powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty." 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981). Appeal
could be taken to a panel of bankruptcy judges, the district court, or the court of appeals.
458 U.S. at 55.
56 This fact was emphasized by Chief Justice Burger, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, J., dissenting); see alro note 114 infra.
57 The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens. 458 U.S. at 52.
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granted to the non-article III federal bankruptcy court. 58 The four
justices stressed the importance of article III in maintaining the separation of powers and independence of the federal judiciary. 59 They
denied that Congress has the unlimited authority to establish legislative courts vested with full judicial powers. 60 Rather, such jurisdiction belongs to article III courts alone, with three exceptions:
territorial courts, military tribunals, and administrative courts adjudicating public rights. 6 1 The bankruptcy court fits none of these exceptions.62 The argument that the bankruptcy court could exercise
full judicial powers as the district court's adjunct had some appeal to
the plurality. 6 3 But they found the relationship between the bankruptcy court and the district court too attenuated; the bankruptcy
court's rendering of final judgments 64 indicates that it, and not the
'65
district court, possesses "the essential attributes of judicial power.
Moreover, appellate review by an article III court does not justify
this exercise of jurisdiction by a non-article III court. 66 The plurality
thus concluded that the judicial powers granted to the federal bank67
ruptcy court were unconstitutional.
The two concurring justices did not adopt so comprehensive a
58
59
60
61

Id. at 87, 89.
Id. at 57-60. See notes 8, 9 supra and accompanying text.
458 U.S. at 63-76.
Id. The plurality stated:
[Wihen properly understood, these precedents represent no broad departure from
the constitutional command that the judicial power of the United States must be
vested in Art. III courts. Rather, they reduce to three narrow situations not subject
to that command, each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of power to
the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that congressional assertion of power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandates of separation of
powers.
Id. at 63-64. Under the pluralities' narrow definition of legislative court, the federal magistrate would be simply an adjunct. Id. at 63 n.13.
62 Id. at 76.
63 Id. at 76-87.
64 Id. at 83-87.
65 Id. at 87.
66 The plurality stated:
Our precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the exercise of
judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal,
where the court is restricted to considerations of law, as well as the nature of the case
as it has been shaped at trial level.
Id. at 86 n.39.
67 The plurality would, it appears, invalidate the entire grant of broad jurisdiction:
We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed. Supp. IV), as added by § 241(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of "the
essential attributes of the judicial power" from the Art. III district court, and has
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conclusion. 68 They agreed with the plurality only to the extent that

bankruptcy judges could not constitutionally render final judgments
in state-law based causes of action. 69 This much narrower conclusion
forms the point upon which the majority of justices agreed, and is
thus the holding of Marathon.70 In the wake of Marathon, the circuit

courts soon began to question the constitutionality of the magistrate
civil trial.
The first case dealing with the issue was Pacemaker Diagnostic
Clinic v. Instromedi4 Inc. ,'71 ("PacemakerI"). In Pacemaker I, a panel of

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that Marathon was
vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant ofjurisdiction cannot
be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.
Id. at 87. The state-law jurisdiction is non-severable, and thus all of§ 1471 is invalid. Id. at
87-88 n.40.
68 Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor
joined. Id. at 89.
69 Justice Rehnquist stated:
I need not decide whether these cases in fact support a general proposition and three
tidy exceptions, as the plurality believes, or whether they are but landmarks on a
judicial "darkling plain" where ignorant armies have clashed by night. . . . I
would, therefore, hold so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection
to be violative of Art. III of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice White wrote a dissent in which Justice Powell
joined. ChiefJustice Burger wrote a separate dissent. Justice White argued that the judicial
powers of article I courts are not so limited:
There is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign to an
Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts. Unless we
want to overrule a large number of our precedents upholding a variety of Art. I
courts-not to speak of those Art. I courts that go by the contemporary name of
"administrative agencies"--this conclusion is inevitable. It is too late to go back
that far; too late to return to the simplicity of the principle pronounced in Art. III
and defended so vigorously and persuasively by Hamilton in the Federalist Nos. 7882. . . . Article III is to be read as expressing one value that must be balanced
against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This Court
retains the final word on how that balance is to be struck.
Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that even if the concurring Justices
were correct concerning the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over state-law based claims, the
Court cannot presume that these provisions are not severable from the rest of § 1471:
The plurality attempts to justify its sweeping invalidation of § 1471, because of its
inclusion ofstate-law claims, by suggesting that this statutory provision is non-severable.. .. The concurring Justices specifically adopt this argument as the reason for
their decision to join the judgment of the Court. The basis for the conclusion of
non-severability, however, is nothing more than a presumption. . . . I had not
thought this to be the contemporary approach to the problem of severability, particularly when dealing with federal statutes.
Id. at 95-97 n.3.
70 I1d. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
71 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn and reh g granted, 718 F. 2d 971 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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dispositive and that the magistrate civil trial was unconstitutional. 72
While the decision was later reversed, 73 the opinion represents the
reasoning of those who argue that the new procedure runs counter to
article III.
PacemakerI was a patent infringement case in which the litigants
consented to a magistrate civil trial under section 363(c) of the
United States Code. 74 In light of the Marathon decision, the Ninth
Circuit raised the constitutionality issue on its own motion, 75 and
found Marathon controlling precedent for any grant of article III judicial power to a non-article III federal court. 76 The court reasoned
that since the magistrate court fails to qualify under any of the three
exceptions in Marathon, the ruling of Marathon applies and the magis77
trate cannot constitutionally render final judgements in civil cases.
Even though district court supervision of the magistrate and litigant
consent are mitigating factors, the court found that these do not adquately protect the article III concerns stressed by the Supreme
Court.78

The Ninth Circuit en banc withdrew this panel decision and
reversed the holding ("PacemakerII").79 The majority concluded that
close district court supervision of the magistrate court and the requirement of litigant consent overcome constitutional objections. 80
Under the statutory scheme, the responsibility for the administration
72 712 F.2d at 1314.
73 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984).
74 712 F.2d at 13.
75 Id. at 1308.
76 Id.
77 The crucial factor for the court was the magistrate's ability to render final and binding
judgments. Such judicial power must be vested in article III courts alone; "[t]his is precisely
the problem with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate makes the ultimate decision and enters
a final judgment. Thus the provision cannot pass constitutional muster as authorizing an
adjunct function of the district court." Id. at 1310.
78 The court stated:
The use of magistrates to conduct trials and enter final judgment implicates both
due process and article III concerns. We recognize that a due process right may be
waived voluntarily, but there is more at stake here than the litigants' due process
right to a decision by an article III judge. We believe that the Constitution establishes a framework of government that cannot be altered by statute nor waived by
litigant consent. The independence of the judiciary, the distribution of power, and
the separation of powers are at stake here.
Id. at 1310.
79 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 1984).
80 The court upheld the constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial due to the judicial
supervision of the magistrate system, the special control exercised by the district court over
the magistrate civil trials, and the litigant consent requirement. Id. at 544-46. The court
added that "[qrom a realistic and practical perspective, reference of civil cases to magistrates
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of justice remains with the district court even though the magistrate
hears the case, 8 ' thus sufficiently protecting the separation of powers
and independence of the federal judiciary. 82 If the magistrate trial
were mandatory, it would violate constitutional rights.83 But under
section 636(c), no magistrate trial will ensue unless all parties freely
and intelligently waive their due process right to an article III
court. 84 The court stressed that this consent requirement distinguishes the present situation from cases limiting the constitutional
85
powers of legislative courts.
Three judges dissented, however, maintaining that the majority
opinion disrupts the constitutional principles recently emphasized by
the Supreme Court. 6 The procedure permits encroachment by the
judiciary on the Congress and the President. 87 Moreover, the magistrate's dependence on the district court impairs freedom in decisionmaking.8 81 Federal judges without article III protection must not, the
dissenters argued, exercise the full judicial power of the United
States.8 9 One dissenting judge further urged that magistrates be
made article III judges, if they must shoulder article III judicial
responsibilities. 90
In reaching their conclusion, the Pacemaker ! majority was influ-

enced by a Third Circuit decision, Wharton-Thomas v. UnitedStates.9 1
In Wharton-Thomas, plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort
with the consent of the parties, subject to careful supervision by Article III judges, may serve
to strengthen an independent judiciary, not undermine it." Id.
81 The court reasoned that the supervisory power of the district court "provides Article
III courts with continuing, plenary responsibility of the administration of the judicial business
of the United States. This responsibility sufficiently protects the judiciary from the encroachment of the other branches to satisfy the separation of powers embodied in Article III." Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 542.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 The dissent stated:
The majority holds that, so long as the parties consent, the power to decide any
federal civil case in the district courts of the United States may be exercised by
individuals who occupy positions that Congress has not established, and who must
depend both upon district judges for their tenure and upon Congress for their compensation. Because I believe this holding disrupts the proper operation of our constitutional system, including the independent exercise of judicial power by
individuals free of outside constraints, I dissent.
Id. at 547 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 549-50.
88 Id. at 549.
89 Id. at 554-55.
90 Id. at 555 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
91 721 F. 2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Claims Act, and both parties consented to a magistrate trial. 9 2 In
light of Marathon and PacemakerI, the court of appeals raised the constitutionality issue sua sponte. 93 The Third Circuit disagreed with
PacemakerI, finding the Marathon holding too narrow to control the
issue. 94 Focusing upon the magistrate's adjunct status and the requirement of litigant consent, the court ruled that the procedure does
not substantially interfere with the structural principles behind article III. 95 Furthermore, the litigant consent requirement introduces
supporting precedent unavailable in the bankruptcy court situation.96 Although the court questioned the wisdom of conducting
magistrate civil trials, it nonetheless found the amendment
97
constitutional .
The Second Circuit has reached the same conclusion in Collins v.
United States.98 Coll'ns concerned a civil rights complaint in which
the parties consented to a magistrate trial. 99 The magistrate found
for the plaintiff, and the district court affirmed.'t° The court of appeals then exercised its option under section 636(c) and granted further appeal.lo° Citing Pacemaker 1, the appellants argued that the
magistrate civil trial violates article 111. t 02 The court's analysis
92 Id. at 924.
93 Id. at 925.
94 Id. at 927.
95 "[T]he magistrate does not function independently of the district court, but as an integral part of it." Id. at 927.
96 The court concluded:
In sum, section 636(c) does not violate article III because:
1. The reference to a magistrate is consensual;
2. The district judge has the power to vacate the reference;
3. The magistrate is appointed by the district judges, is a part of the district court,
and is specially designated to try cases;
4. The parties have a right of appeal to a district judge or the court of appeals.
We decline to follow the Pacemaker panel decision because it reads too much
into Northern Pipeline. The distinctions between the magistrate system incorporated
into the district court and the independent bankruptcy courts are such that Northern
Pzbeine's ban against non-Article III tribunals in private rights cases does not apply
here.
Id. at 929-30.
97 "We do not deny that there may be basis for concern about the wisdom of large scale
delegation of adjudication to magistrates." Id. at 930. The Third Circuit reaffirmed WhartonThomas in Williams v. Mussomelli. 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983).
98 No. 83-7938, slip op. at 1828 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1984).
99 Even though the technical requirements of§ 636(c) were not followed, the court found
that consent was freely given. Id. at 1831-32.
100 Id. at 1828-29.
101 Id. at 1829-30.
102 Id. at 1834.
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hinged upon Marathon,103 not emphasizing narrowness of the Court's
ultimate holding, but the differences between the plurality opinion
and the present issue. 104 According to the Second Circuit, the Marathon plurality did not mandate that only district courts render final
judgments. 105 Instead, the Marathon Court demanded that article III
principles not be substantially affected by the legislative court's exercise of judicial power. 10 6 According to the court, the district court
control of the magistrate is an adequate alternative to article III protections. t0 7 Coupled with the litigant consent requirement, the adjunct status of the magistrate court keeps the magistrate civil trial
from substantially affecting the separation of powers and the independence of the federal judiciary. 0 8
The First Circuit has also approved the magistrate civil trial.
In Goldstein v. Kelleher, t0 9 a diversity suit heard by a magistrate sitting
with ajury, n 0 the appellant raised the constitutionality issue, but the
court of appeals found that adjunct status and litigant consent justified the magistrate civil trial.I t ' The court reasoned that district
court control preserves the interests of the judiciary, while litigant
12
consent protects the due process rights of the parties.'
As the issue comes before the circuits, then, the courts are finding the magistrate civil trial constitutional. Still, PacemakerI and the
103 Id. at 1836-39.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1840-41.
106 The court argued:
But while "ultimate decisionmaking authority" is a sufficient condition for a finding
that a challenged scheme does not offend the policy of separation of powers, it is not
a necessary condition for such a finding. What we must decide is whether section
636(c) impermissibly allows district judges to place magistrates under the control of
the executive or legislative branches. . . .The relevant question then is whether
636(c) changes the nature of the pressures on the independence of magistrates. We
find that it does not.
Id. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1979); PacemakerII, 725
F.2d at 544.
107 No. 83-7938, slip op. at 1841.
108 Id. at 1848-52. The consent requirement, according to the court, serves three distinct
purposes: it fulfills jurisdictional prerequisites, affects the limits of permissible delegation, and
provides a constraint against the complete delegation of judicial responsibilities to the
magistrate.
109 No. 83-1411, slip op. at I (1st Cir. 1984).
110 Id. at 2-3.
111 Id. at 2-8.
112 The court concluded, "[t]he litigants' interests are safeguarded by the consensual nature of the reference; the institutional interests of the judiciary are secured by the district
court's control over both the references and appointments, and by the availability of appeal
to an Article III court." Id. at 8.
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dissent in Pacemaker II demonstrate that the new procedure faces
powerful critics. After Marathon, the issue is certain to continually
arise. Therefore, the threshold question in a constitutional analysis
of the magistrate civil trial must be whether Marathon controls.
II. Constitutional Analysis of the Magistrate Civil Trial
Marathon determines the constitutionality of the magistrate civil
trial if that opinion establishes that a legislative court, with three
narrow exceptions, cannot constitutionally exercise full judicial powers. But this is not the legacy of Marathon. Instead, the decision produced a limited holding not directly affecting the constitutionality of
the magistrate civil trial. Marathon may raise the issue, but it does
not control the outcome.
While the Marathon plurality opinion encompassed the general
law of legislative court jurisdiction, the holding of the Court did
not."13 The Marathon decision ultimately establishes that the jurisdiction granted to the article I federal bankruptcy court over state-based
claims only peripherally related to the main bankruptcy claim is an
unconstitutional delegation of article III judicial power.11 4 This
holding does not pertain to the general judicial powers of the magistrate court.
Furthermore, significant differences exist between the Marathon
plurality opinion and the present issue. Close ties bind the magistrate court and the district court. Unlike the bankruptcy court situation in Marathon, the district court clearly possesses the ultimate
jurisdiction through its control of the magistrate."t 5 Indeed, the adjunct status of the bankruptcy court was the area the Marathon plurality seemed most willing to explore. 16 A further distinction is the
litigant consent requirement, which marshals a new and impressive
113 See notes 68-69supra and accompanying text. The Third Circuit relied upon this point
in Wharton-Thomas. 721 F.2d at 926.
114 The Court's holding was characterized by Chief Justice Burger:
I write separately to emphasize that, notwithstanding the plurality opinion, the
court does not hold today that Congress' broad grant ofjurisdiction to the new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Article III of the Constitution. Rather,
the Court's holding is limited to the proposition stated by Justice Rehnquist in his
concurrence in the judgment that a "traditional" state common-law action, not
made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must absent the consent of the litigants,
be heard by an "Article III court" if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the
United States.
458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, J., dissenting).
115 See notes 125-39 infra and accompanying text.
116 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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line of precedent for the magistrate civil trial not applicable to the
situation in Marathon. 17 In short, Marathon is not sufficiently analogous to control the current constitutional analysis of the magistrate
civil trial. Marathon, therefore, is not dispositive. Still, it alerts the
courts to the legitimate constitutional concerns raised by the magistrate civil trial.
The magistrate trial implicates the fundamental structural values and due process rights provided by article III. The magistrate
lacks traditional article III tenure and compensation safeguards,
thereby threatening the independence of the federal judiciary. Furthermore, the separation of powers may be weakened by erosion
within the judicial branch due to the constant delegation of judicial
authority to a legislative court.' 18 The judiciary, through its authority to appoint magistrates, also diminishes Presidential and Congressional powers.' 19 These are plausible, realistic concerns that affect the
constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial.
Aside from broad governmental principles, there are additional
problems with the magistrate civil trial. First, the magistrate is not
subject to the same rigorous appointment procedure as the district
court judge, a procedure designed to assure the highest quality judicial decisions. 120 Second, the appellate option under section 636(c)
places the district judge in the unusual position of acting as an appellate court, 12 1 a position that may be especially uncomfortable if the
judge helped appoint and can remove the magistrate. 2 2 Third, and
117 See notes 144-45 infia and accompanying text.
118 This consideration was important to the dissenting judges in Pacemaker!!. 725 F.2d at
552-53 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
119 The dissenting judges in Pacemaker ! emphasized this point:
The loss of the independent exercise of judicial power, the principal check on
encroachment by the legislative and executive branches, is not the only effect of the
Magistrates Act on our system of government. The Act also interferes seriously with
the legislative and executive checks on incursions by the judiciary.
Id. at 549. The statutory structure undermines the power of Congress to create judgeships,
the President's power of appointment, and the Senate's power of confirmation. Id.
120 The magistrate is appointed by the district court judges, there is no presidental selection or Senate confirmation. 28 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (Supp. V 1981); see note 29 supra.
121 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981); see note 46supra.
122 See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 138 (testimony of Pamela S. Horowitz, legislative counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). Rep. Drinnan characterized the situation as
follows:
Well, these creatures called magistrates used to be U.S. commissioners and they
had a very limited role. All of a sudden they're fact-finders and they're judges. Just
to put it in the concrete, I spoke to a man recently who was a litigant in a Federal
court and he waited a long time before he got his day in court. He then said the
presiding official wasn't even ajudge; it was a magistrate. That man didn't even get
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perhaps most important, litigants may be subtly coerced into a magistrate trial by both district court backload and perhaps pressure applied by the court. 123 Such coercion could bring about a "poor
peoples' " federal court.124 These are serious objections to the magistrate civil trial.
Even with Marathon aside, then, the magistrate civil trial raises
fundamental concerns. As the circuit courts have stressed, however,
two factors substantially mitigate the problems and preserve the
magistrate civil trial from the fate of the bankruptcy court: the close
adjunct status of the magistrate and litigant consent.
Article III court supervision of the magistrate significantly diminishes possible threats to the separation of powers and the independence of the federal judiciary.1 25 The structure of the magistrate
court assures that the district judge retains the responsibility for the
administration of justice in the federal courts, which, in turn, preserves the independence of the judicial branch. This control
manifests itself in several ways. The Judicial Conference, a group
composed of article III judges, decides upon the number of magis126
Appointment 27
trates per district and sets the magistrate's salary.
and removal 128 are the province of the district courts, which also proa judge in the Federal court. The decision was adverse and he understands the
futility of appealing a magistrate's decision to the judge who appointed the
magistrate.
Id. at 63.
123 See Note, Article III Constraintsand the Expanding CivilJurisdictionofFederalMagistrates: A
Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1047-61 (1979). The author predicts "the aggregate denial of Article III hearings to large numbers of federal litigants" when poorer litigants are
coerced into the magistrate court. Id at 1050. "[The] denial will appear illusory on the individual level, since any litigant tapped by the district court for reference might choose instead
to 'purchase' a constitutional judge by accepting the attendant waiting costs and forcing his
adversary to do likewise." Id. The same concern influenced the dissenting judges in Pacemaker
If: "it ignores reality to suppose that at least some busy district courts will not control their
dockets by pressurring litigants to consent to trial before a magistrate." 756 F.2d at 554
(Schroeder, J., dissenting); see also 1977 House Hearings,supra note 19, at 112-14 (statements of
Hon. Robert J. Drinnan).
124 Note, supra note 123, at 1052.
125 This conclusion has been reached by commentators and the circuit courts. See, e.g.,
Goldstein, No. 83-1411 slip op. at 8; Collins, No. 83-7938 slip op. at 2839-43; Pacemaker !!, 725
F.2d at 927-30; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927-30; 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at
111-12 (testimony of Hon. Joseph D. Tydings); McCabe, supra note 19, at 365-74.
126 "The conference shall determine, in light of the recommendations of the Director, the
district courts and the councils, the number of full-time United States magistrates, and parttime magistrates, the locations at which they shall serve, and their respective salaries." 28
U.S.C. § 633(b) (Supp. V 1981).
127 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1981).
128 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (Supp. V 1981).
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mulgate the rules under which the magistrate operates. 129 The district court enforces magistrate orders, 30 and contempt of the
magistrate is contempt of the district court.' 3' Finally, the magis32
trate uses the district court's clerk and calendar.
This district court supervision of the magistrate system assures
that the performance of the district court's essential constitutional
role is not impaired by the magistrate civil trial. The statutory
scheme insulates the magistrate from the direct influence of the other
branches of the federal government, the state governments, and private individuals.133 The magistrate is dependent upon the district
court, not the legislative or judicial branch, or any outside authority.
Again, article III judges themselves appoint the magistrates and determine their number. This district court supervision should thwart
the dilution of article III court powers and the degrading of their
status. 34 The extra measure of control maintained by the district
court over the magistrate civil trial reinforces this conclusion.
While section 636(c) expands the judicial powers of the magistrate, it also increases district court control over the litigation, without increasing congressional or executive control over the
magistrate. 135 The magistrate can hear civil cases only if the district
court so designates.' 36 The court also retains the authority to vacate
a magistrate reference for good cause, 137 which can include the nature and precedential value of the case. 138 The appellate option in129 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
130 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (Supp. V 1981).
131 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (Supp. V 1981).
132 Motions before the federal magistrate are filed through the district court clerk; there
are no special provisions for magistrate civil trials. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
133 McCabe, supra note 19, at 365-74; Pacemaker I1, 725 F.2d at 544-45: Wharton-Thomas,
721 F.2d at 927-30.
134 Concerning the influence the district judge can have upon the magistrate, the Third
Circuit in Wharton-Thomas reasoned that since the mandatory district court review of the magistrate's case recommendations was constitutional, the much lesser influence the district court
exercises through the appellate provisions of§ 636(c) is constitutional. 621 F.2d at 927. Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]here is no reason to even speculate that district judges
would improperly attempt to influence a magistrate's decisions, but any such conduct would
implicate due process, rather than Article III." Id. at 927 n.8.
135 Instead, the responsibilities of delegation and administration lie with the judicial Conference and the district courts. While this does affect the appointment and confirmation
powers of the other branches of the federal government, as the dissenters pointed out in PacemakerII, this situation exists in all the other judicial functions performed by the federal magistrate and has not been judged a substantial interference with the separation of powers.
136 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
137 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (Supp. V 1981).
138 Although there has been no litigation concerning the statutory term "for good cause,"
Congress stated that, "[t]his removal power is to be exercised only where it is appropriate to
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creases district court control by allowing the court to review a case on
the record.' 39 But while district court supervision of the magistrate
system and the magistrate civil trial is an important mitigating factor, litigant consent is crucial.
The consent requirement assures that litigants are not denied
their right to an article III tribunal."4° Instead, they freely exercise
their option for the sake of judicial efficiency and with confidence in
the magistrate.' 4 1 This prerequisite to the magistrate civil trial also
helps justify the broadened jurisdiction of the magistrate 42 and puts
a natural restraint on the wholesale delegation of judicial powers to a
magistrate court.' 43 But most significantly, litigant consent places
the constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial in a different light,
for it introduces an impressive line of supporting precedent.'" Furthermore, it severs the present issue from unsupportive precedent, in145
cluding Marathon, that restricted the powers of legislative courts.
have the trial before an article III judicial officer because of the extraordinary questions of
law at issue and judicial decisionmaking is likely to have wide precedential importance."
1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 14.
139 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(9) (Supp. V 1981); see McCabe, supra note 19, at 366-69.
140 See Goldstein, No. 83-1411 slip op. at 5-8; Collins, No. 82-7938 slip op. at 1845-52; Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 542-47; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 926-30; 1979 Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 4, ("in light of this requirement of consent no witness at the hearings on the bill
found any constitutional question that could be raised against the provision"); see also McCabe, supra note 19, at 374-79; 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 182-86 (testimony of
Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney Gen., Justice Dep't).
141 McCabe, supra note 19, at 374. The amendment contains provisions assuring the voluntariness of litigant consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981), and Congress has emphasized this point, 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 5.
142 Collins, No. 82-7938 slip op. at 1850-51.
143 Id. at 1851.
144 Analogous situations in which litigants have validly waived their constitutional trial
rights include: right to jury trial, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 438 (1930); special master
hearings, Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); self-incrimination, Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648 (1976); unreasonable searches and seizures, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); and speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The pre-1979 district court experimentations with the magistrate civil trial were held constitutional by the
courts largely due to the litigant consent requirement. See Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for
the Blind, 630 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1980); Banks v. United States, 614 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1980),
Muhick v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1980); DeCosta, 520 F.2d at 499. Mandatory de
novo review by the district courts also played an important part in these earlier decisions.
145 Earlier restrictive holdings on the magistrate's judicial power did not involve the crucial element of litigant consent. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (concerning the
mandatory appeal of social security decisions to the magistrate); Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (concerning the automatic reference of a suppression motion to a magistrate). The Third Circuit
stated in Wharton-Thomas:
[A]lthough all three Supreme Court decisions emphasized that final decision-making authority rests in an Article III court, they did so in circumstances where the
non-Article III officer was forced on the parties. Weber, Raddatz, and Northern Pipe-
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Neither the litigant consent requirement nor district court supervision of the magistrate alone would sufficiently address the article III concerns generated by section 636(c). 146 Even though the

district court closely supervises the magistrate, litigants cannot be automatically denied access to an article III court. 147 Conversely, litigants may freely consent to a magistrate trial, but if the ties between
the district court and the adjunct are weak, fundamental constitutional principles may be violated. 148 Only in the combination of litigant consent and adjunct status does an adequate substitute for
article III protections emerge.
The more practical problems with the magistrate civil trial
should not change this conclusion. These objections, while real and
serious, address the wisdom of the legislation and not its constitutionality. In the face of clear Congressional intent and the proper restrictions upon judicial review, the burden of proving unconstitutionality
is greater than any of these objections. For example, there is a possibility of subtle coercion in obtaining litigant consent to the magistrate trial; however, the chance for judicial coercion exists in other
aspects of federal litigation that are, nonetheless, clearly constitutional. 49 The same argument applies to the appellate review and
appointment provisions; they ultimately are leveled at the wisdom of
the legislation and not its basic constitutionality. These problems
were recognized by Congress and now by the circuit courts, but they
have not rendered the magistrate civil trial unconstitutional. 50
III.

Possible Modifications to the Magistrate Civil Trial

Increased district court control over the litigation before the
magistrate could minimize constitutional concerns and alleviate variline can be read as establishing that the decision making power must remain in the
Article III district court when the parties have not consented to a determination by
a non-Article III office. The cases do not provide a determinative principle in instances of consensual reference.
721 F.2d at 928. On the difference litigant consent makes in the Marathon decision, see note
114 supra and accompanying text.
146 No recent decision upholding the constitutionality of the magistrate court trial relies
solely upon one of these bases. See notes 79-112 supra and accompanying text.
147 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
148 See notes 8-14 and 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
149 Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 976. Furthermore, since all litigants, including wealthy
corporations and individuals, stand to benefit from the efficiency of a magistrate civil trial,
the evolution of a "poor peoples' " federal court seems improbable.
150 Both provisions were debated during the congressional hearings. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 53-198; 1979 Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 1-76.
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ous practical defects in the magistrate civil trial. 51 An increase in
district court control, however, decreases the overall efficiency of the
system; efficiency provides increased access to the federal system, the
primary advantage of the magistrate civil trial. 152 Any modification
to the 1979 amendment must successfully balance these factors.
Presently, the district court designates the magistrate to hear
civil cases in general.1 53 This general grant could be altered to
designation on a case by case basis, with a corresponding increase in
district court supervision of the litigation. More court time would be
expended, but when the case is designated for a magistrate civil trial,
the bulk of litigation time still would be spent before the magistrate.
The modification would preserve the benefits of the present system,
while assuring a greater measure of article III court control.1 54 But
case by case designation is only one way to achieve these ends.
The Marathon plurality intended to prohibit non-article III
courts from rendering final judgments.1 55 Should the Supreme Court
adopt this more stringent approach to legislative court jurisdiction,
the problem could be solved by instituting a "magistrate's judgment"
in lieu of a formal binding judgment.1 56 While the litigation itself
takes place before the magistrate, the district court would bear the
responsibility for issuing the final judgment. This is not an evasive
device, but a way to increase district court control by making review
of the magistrate trial proceedings automatic. This modification
would be especially potent if combined with case by case designation.
Thus the procedure could be saved from constitutional peril, the
quality of magistrate decision-making better assured, and the essential purposes of the magistrate civil trial retained.
Should case by case designation and the "magistrate's judgment" not be acceptable, a close substitute would be de novo review
by the district court. At present, the district court reviews the case
on the record. 57 With de novo review, the district court would,
151 See Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 930 ("[We do not deny that there may be basis for
concern about the wisdom of large scale delegation of adjudication to magistrates.").
152 See 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 1.
153 28. U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
154 Case by case designation was proposed in the original bill. See Note, supra note 123, at
105. But Congress believed that such designation could lead to only certain types of cases
being heard by the magistrate. See 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18. In the balance, the
risk of such wrongful use of the magistrate does not outweigh the gain to be had in improved
district court control of the litigation before the magistrate judge.
155 See notes 49-67 supra and accompanying text.
156 The idea originated in McCabe, supra note 19, at 379.
157 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
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when functioning in its appellate capacity, make its own determinations concerning the aspects of the magistrate's decision to which the
appellant objects. While de novo review is more time consuming
than review upon the record, it would pertain only to cases on appeal. Futhermore, since it may make the magistrate civil trial more
appealing to litigants, de novo review could contribute to the overall
efficiency of the federal court system.1 58
If none of the above modifications are introduced, litigants
choosing the district court appellate option under section § 636(c)
should at least be given a further right of appeal to the circuit court.
This would stengthen article III court control and would check conflict of interest in the district court review of its magistrate.
None of these suggestions should seriously hamper the efficiency
of the magistrate civil trial. They will, to varying degrees, increase
district court control over the litigation. This improves the procedure and makes it even more attractive to litigants.
One possible modification, however, should not be adopted: the
granting of article III status to the magistrate. 159 While this is a possible solution to the bankruptcy court conundrum,1 60 it would defeat
the very idea behind the magistrate civil trial, which is to increase
access to the federal courts by utilizing a more flexible and less ex16
pensive judicial officer than the traditional article III judge. 1 Sim-

ply increasing the number of federal judges deprives the federal
courts of a unique tool useful in addressing the heavy caseload and
changing needs of the federal judiciary.
IV. Conclusion
Practitioners have welcomed the magistrate civil trial as a
means to ameliorate the traditional difficulties of bringing suit in federal court. The procedure could not be justified, however, if it
threatened the separation of powers and the independence of the federal judiciary. To avoid this result, Congress has incorporated two
substitutes for traditional article III protections: district court supervision and litigant consent. Both preserve constitutional values, yet
maintain the flexibility and low cost of the magistrate system.
While the magistrate civil trial may need improvement, it is
158 The Pacemaker "I court found the idea of de novo review, while not constitutionally
required, nonetheless advantageous. 725 F.2d at 546.
159 Id. at 555 (Pregerson, J. dissenting).
160 See Levit & Mason, supra note 48, at 357-58.
161 See Pacemaker!!, 725 F.2d at 547; 1979 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4-5; McCabe, supra
note 19, at 380-90.
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nonetheless a constitutional procedure. Indeed, by increasing access
to the federal courts system while similtaneously lessening the district
court caseload, the magistrate civil trial has already substantially
contributed to the justice system. The circuit courts which have considered the issue have found this innovative procedure consistent
with article III. Their conclusion should prevail when the constitutionality of the magistrate civil trial is ultimately resolved.
Neal T Buethe

